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FIDUCIARY INCOME TAXATION AND THE HOLLO WA Y
ADJUSTMENT
by
DENNIS

A

E. BIRES*

of the complexity of the rules dealing with income taxation of
trusts and estates' can be attributed to the imperfect compatibility of
two different regimes of law: the federal taxation of income and local rules of
trust accounting.2 Just as the confluence of two rivers may generate turbulence
GREAT DEAL

exceeding that of either branch, the meeting of federal tax law and state trust
law in Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code generates problems that
neither discipline would present by itself.'
The operation of income tax rules often causes inequities among the
beneficiaries of a trust or estate.' In a few instances, state courts and
legislatures have responded to tax-induced inequities by devising new rules of
local trust law, known as equitable adjustments,5 to restore equity among such
beneficiaries.' These are local rules of fiduciary administration that would not
Dennis E. Bires (B.A., 1976, Allegheny College; J.D., 1979, New York University; LL.M, 1984, New York
University) is an Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Guy B. Maxfield, William 0. Schmidt, Albert G. Doumar, and Judson L. Temple for their comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
'Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code, §§ 641 through 692, is the source of income tax rules for
fiduciaries. The field is sometimes referred to as "fiduciary income taxation."
'The Internal Revenue Code does not purport to impose rules for fiduciary administration. Rather, it defines
income tax rules which are applied in the context of each state's law of trust and estate administration. See
M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES

2-3 (1970).
'An important example of this inconsistency is the difficulty of reconciling the local law distinction of "income" versus "principal" with the federal concept of "taxable income." Congress has chosen to ignore the
local income/principal distinction in some instances in the computation of taxable income for trusts, estates,
and their beneficiaries. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 662(a)(2) (distributions includable in beneficiaries' gross income
may consist of either trust income or principal); I.R.C. § 641(b) (taxable income of estates and trusts computed in the same manner as for individuals, therefore, expenses paid from principal are deductible against
income for tax purposes); Treas. Reg. § 1.643(d)-2(a) (1985) (expenses paid from principal are deductible in
computing beneficiaries' gross income).
'For instance, an executor's election under I.R.C. § 642(g) to deduct estate administration expenses for federal income tax purposes rather than for federal estate tax purposes may work to the detriment of the
estate's principal beneficiaries. Administration expenses are paid largely from principal, and if deducted for
estate tax purposes, reduce the amount of estate tax payable, also from principal. If the expenses are deducted for estate income tax purposes, the principal account of the trust loses twice. It loses by being charged
for the expenses themselves and by receiving no deduction against federal estate tax to partially make up for
the first loss. The benefit of the income tax deduction falls to the income account. See In re Estate of Warms,
140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. 1955); see also infra note 6.
'On equitable adjustments generally, see Carrico & Bondurant, Equitable Adjustments: A Survey and
Analysis of Precedents and Practice, 36 TAX LAW. 545 (1983); Dobris, Equitable Adjustments in
Postmortem Income Tax Planning:An UnremittingDiet of Warms, 65 IowA L. REV. 103 (1979).
'The inequity caused by the executor's election under I.R.C. §64 2(g), seesupra note 4, has been remedied in
New York by the enactment of § 11-1.2 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, codifying In re Estate of
Warms, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. 1955). The statute provides that the income beneficiaries, or the income
account of the estate, must reimburse the principal account in the amount of any increased estate taxes
127
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have arisen but for a disturbance of trust administration occasioned by the
federal tax law. A less well-known problem, only recently emerging as a concern for fiduciaries and the Internal Revenue Service, is the need to apply
federal tax rules to the new relationships set up by local law equitable adjustments.7 The complex interaction of federal and state law here reaches a
perhaps absurd extreme: federal tax rules must be applied to local rules of administration which themselves arose only in response to other federal tax rules.
However, this third level in the interaction cannot be ignored. The income tax
must be collected wherever income is earned, and new state law rules of
fiduciary administration may occasion new variations on the application of the
tax law. One can only hope that a fourth and fifth level of this state/federal interaction will not result.
In 1972, a New York Surrogate's Court introduced the Holloway8 adjustment to fiduciary accounting. This equitable adjustment was seen as necessary
to restore the balance between the interests of income and principal beneficiaries of certain trusts after that balance had been upset by the effects of Subchapter J,9 particularly where executors had utilized a popular tax-saving technique known as the "trapping distribution."'' 0 In these instances, the first element of the federal/local law interaction would be the Subchapter J tax rules
that make "trapping distributions" possible. The second level, the response of
local trust law to a tax-induced inequity, is the Holloway adjustment itself.
The third level, and the subject of this article, is the federal tax law's treatment
of the new relationships created by the Holloway adjustment. At this point, an
introduction to trapping distributions and to the Holloway adjustment is
necessary.
1.TRAPPING

DISTRIBUTIONS

The Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides generally that trusts and
estates are to be taxed on the income they earn, except to the extent the income is distributed to beneficiaries." The Code uses the concept of
resulting from the executor's election to deduct administration expenses for income tax rather than estate
tax purposes (the "Warms adjustment"). N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-I.2(A)(McKinney 1967).
'See Blattmachr, The Tax Effects of Equitable Adjustments: An Internal Revenue Code Odyssey, 18 INST.
ON EST. PLAN. 14-I (1984); Blattmachr, A Primer on the Effects of Equitable Adjustments, 124 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 21 (June 1985).
'In re Holloway's Estate, 68 Misc. 2d 361, 327 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sur. Ct. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as
"Holloway H1"or "Holloway"), modifying 67 Misc. 2d 132, 323 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1971) [hereinafter referred to
as "Holloway I"l.
'See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
"I.R.C. § 641(a) and (b) (imposition of tax on taxable income of estates and trusts; taxable income computed

in the same manner as for individuals); §§ 651(a) and 661(a) (distribution deduction allowed to trusts and
estates for amounts distributed to beneficiaries). On the computation of trusts' and estates' taxable income,
the distribution deduction, and amounts includable in the gross income of beneficiaries, see generally A.
MICHAELSON & J.BLATTMACHR, INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS 5-29, 47-93 (11 th ed. 1980);

and M.

FERGUSON,

J. FREELAND &

BENEFICIARIES, 301-37, 381-458 (1970).

R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME

TAXATION OF ESTATES AND
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distributable net income (DNI), which is defined as taxable income with certain modifications, 2 to refer to the income which each year must be taken into
account by either the fiduciary or the beneficiaries, or split between the two. 3
Amounts of taxable DNI distributed to beneficiaries are deductible by the trust
or estate against taxable income, 4 but must be included in the gross income of
the beneficiaries. 5 To prevent fiduciaries from making what would otherwise
be "tax-free" distributions of principal, rather than income, to beneficiaries, the
Code provides that all distributions, whetherfrom income or principal,"carry
out" DNI to the beneficiaries. 6 Therefore, corpus distributions, like income
distributions, cause DNI to be included in the beneficiaries' gross income" (and
deductible by the fiduciary), 8 to the extent the trust or estate has DNI in the
year of distribution. 9
The rule that all distributions, including those of trust or estate principal,
carry out taxable income to beneficiaries has been used to great advantage by
sophisticated fiduciaries. Often the residuary beneficiary of a decedent's estate
will be a testamentary trust, which by the terms of the decedent's will is a simple trust, i.e., it is required to distribute all its income to its beneficiaries currently.2 The executor can make a distribution to such a trust from estate principal" in an amount sufficient to carry out all, or any predetermined portion
of, the estate's taxable income for the year. The Code prevents this from
becoming a "tax-free" distribution of principal. However, the executor's purpose is precisely to have the trust pay the tax on estate income "attributed" to
"I.R.C. § 643(a). The most important modifications of taxable income in arriving at DNI are the following:
omission of most capital gains; and the deductions for distributions, personal exemption, and for long term
capital gains; as well as the dividend exclusion; and inclusion of tax-exempt interest. I.R.C. § 643(a)(1), (2),
(3), (5) and (7).
"Such income might not consist entirely of taxable income. For example, DNI includes tax-exempt interest.
I.R.C. § 643(a)(5). An additional function of the DNI concept is to preserve the character of the various
items of income Which make up DNI and when distributions are made, to allocate these items to
beneficiaries in the same proportions as they are earned in the trust or estate. I.R.C. §§ 652(b) and 662(b).
"'I.R.C. §§ 651(a), 661(a).
"I.R.C. §§ 652(a), 662(a).
'1.R.C. § 662(a)(2) ("other amounts" not limited to accounting income). Seealso Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-3(a),
(b)(1985).
17Id.

18I.R.C. § 661(a)(2). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(c)(1985).
1l.R.C. §§ 661(a)(2), 662(a)(2) (deduction to trust or estate and inclusion in beneficiaries' gross income is
limited to the amount of DNI of the trust or estate).
'"The complete definition of a simple trust is one which (l) is required by its instrument to distribute all its accounting income currently, (2) is not required by the instrument to make distributions to charity, and (3)
does not distribute corpus or accumulated income in the current year. A trust which is not a simple trust is a
complex trust. A trust may be a simple trust in one year and a complex trust in another year. I.R.C. § 65 1(a);
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.651(a)-l, 1.661(a)-1(1985).
"Executors are virtually never required by will provisions to distribute all of an estate's income currently
during administration. Moreover, estates are not subject to the throwback rules of Subchapter J, which are
intended to discourage income accumulations by trusts. Treas. Reg. § 1.665(a)-O(I 985). Therefore, it is not
unusual for an executor to distribute only estate corpus during a taxable year of the estate and to accumulate all the income earned during the year.
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it by the distribution.22 This would ordinarily be impossible because the trust,
as a simple trust, is required to distribute all its income to its beneficiary (an individual)23 currently. Therefore, all of a simple trust's taxable income, including income received from an estate, is generally carried out to the
beneficiary, rendering the trust a nonpayer of income tax each year. 4
The executor succeeds, however, in making the trust the taxpayer for the
estate "income" passed out to it because for fiduciary accounting purposes the
distribution of estate principal retains its character as principal in the trust.25
The trustee of the simple trust is not required by the instrument to distribute
principal to the beneficiary; only trust income. The fact that for tax purposes
the estate's principal distribution "carries out" taxable income to the trust is
irrelevant to the trustee's responsibilities under the instrument and under local
law. The trustee is not even permitted, in many cases, to pass on this incomeladen principal to the beneficiary. 6 The trust is left to pay the income tax on
the estate income attributed to it. The taxable income is "trapped" in the simple trust (it cannot be passed on to the beneficiary); hence, the term "trapping
distribution."
The trapping distribution is particularly useful where the individual
beneficiary of the simple trust is in a high income tax bracket. The tax on a
portion of the estate's income is paid by the lower-bracket trust rather than the
high-bracket individual or the estate. Nonetheless, the income beneficiary
ultimately will receive all the income earned in both the estate and the trust.
II.

THE HOLLOWA Y ADJUSTMENT

The trust which has received a trapping distribution from an estate must
pay the tax on income that was earned in the estate."' Ordinarily a trustee must
22

See R. COVEY, MARITAL DEDUCTION AND CREDIT SHELTER DISPOSITIONS AND THE USE OF FORMULA PROVI-

SIONS 48-49 (1984); Cohan & Frimmer, Trapping Distributions -

The Trap That Pays, 112 TRUSTS &

ESTATES 766 (1973).
"Although trusts may have multiple beneficiaries, hereinafter for convenience trust beneficiaries will be
referred to in the singular.
'Simple trusts frequently have no income tax liability because the distribution deduction, for amounts distributed to beneficiaries, reduces taxable income to zero or less. See I.R.C. § 65 1(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.651(b)1(1985). However, simple trusts which realize net capital gains during a taxable year generally will pay income tax on the capital gains because capital gains are principal items for trust accounting purposes and are
not affected by a trust provision requiring distribution of all income currently.
"N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.1(b)(2) (McKinney 1967); Uniform Principal and Income Act
(1962) § 3(b), 7B U.L.A. 155-56 (1985).
The Service has privately endorsed this tax treatment of trapping distribution in Technical Advice

Memorandum 7809057.
in its purest form, the instrument of a simple trust directs the trustee to distribute all income of the trust
currently. It does not authorize corpus distributions until termination or until the occurrence of some other
event fundamentally altering the character of the trust. Trustee discretion to distribute corpus, however, is
not incompatible with simple trust status. Such a trust may be a complex trust in years when the trustee
chooses to invade corpus and a simple trust in years when corpus remains untouched, provided all income is
required to be distributed currently in every year. Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-I.
"See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
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pay income tax using funds from the trust's income account." This rule can be
said to be based on fairness. Income taxes are imposed only if income is earned,
and they increase as income increases. The beneficiary receiving the benefits of
the income should be called upon to bear the burden of the tax. It must be
borne in mind that although the "trapped" income resides for tax purposes in
the corpus account of the trust, it originally was earned in the income account
of the estate. Furthermore, setting aside for a moment all tax fictions, the actual dollars which were earned in the estate remain in the income account of
the estate. These funds will ultimately be enjoyed by the income beneficiary of
the trust.29 Consequently, payment of the income tax on those dollars from the
income account of the trust would locate the burden fairly.
A trust receiving a trapping distribution might have no income account
from which to pay the tax. For example, the trust might not have been in existence long enough to earn any income. Even the trapping distribution itself
consists wholly of estate principal. As was previously noted,' the distribution
would retain its character as principal in the trust. The trustee would have no
choice but to pay the income tax out of the trust's principal account, 3 which
would have ample assets for this purpose due to the distribution received from
the estate.
This payment of income tax out of trust principal creates the unfairness'
which requires an equitable adjustment. Trust principal has paid an obligation
that under fiduciary accounting rules-2 should have been paid from income.3
nSee, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.1(1)(1)(B) (McKinney 1967); Uniform Principal and Income Act (1962) § 13(a)(6); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 807 (rev. 2d ed.,
198 1). An important exception to this rule is the requirement that the trustee pay from principal any income
tax on items of taxable income that are principal for trust accounting purposes, such as capital gains and income in respect of a decedent. See, e.g., N.Y. EST.. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § I l-2.1()(4)(C)(McKinney
1967).
"The income beneficiary of a residuary trust will likely receive the income accumulated in the estate by one
of two means. First, the executor may distribute the income to the simple trust in a subsequent year, setting
in motion an automatic and equivalent distribution by the trust to its income beneficiary. Alternatively, the
executor may distribute the income directly to the trust beneficiary, bypassing the pointless passage through
the trust. Passing the accumulated estate income through the trust might have the disadvantage of triggering an accumulation distribution for the trust under § 665(b) of the throwback rules if the trust has any accumulated income.
Not only is the trust beneficiary likely to receive the accumulated income of the estate by one means or
another, but he or she will most likely receive it tax-free. The DNI associated with the income will have been
carried off to the trust in the trapping distribution, leaving accounting income that is tax-neutral in the
estate. When ultimately passed on to the trust beneficiary, no DNI will be carried by this income. The
beneficiary may receive estate DNI in the same year; however, its source will be current income of the year
of the distribution, not the accumulated income.
"See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
"Additional choices for payment of the tax may be provided by the executor, who may be a different person
than the trustee. The executor could pay the portion of the trust's income tax attributable to the trapping
distribution. In the alternative, the executor could distribute an additonal amount to the trust to be used to
pay the tax. In both alternatives, the amounts paid out by the executor would constitute additional distributions to the trust, carrying DNI with them. See Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4(1985).
"See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
"To the extent a trapping distribution consists of income in respect of a decedent, I.R.C. § 691(a), which is
always corpus, trust principal is the proper source for payment of the income tax, Principal is not discharg-
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The remaindermen's interests have been reduced by the tax payment. Furthermore, the trust's income beneficiary will ultimately receive tax-free34 the estate
income which the executor accumulated in the year of the trapping distribution.
In Holloway I, a guardian ad litem for the remaindermen of four trusts
which had received trapping distributions demanded that the income account
of each trust reimburse the principal account for the tax which principal had
paid." This "equitable adjustment" would erase the unfairness detailed above.
In its first opinion, the Surrogate's Court denied the request for the adjustment.36 The Surrogate in Holloway Idid not prohibit the adjustment but found
that the trustee had not acted unreasonably in failing to make the
adjustment. 7
The guardian moved to reargue the case. After a second hearing, with the
aid of an amicus brief from the New York State Bankers Association (Trust
Division) and with the acquiescence of the trustee, who on reargument took no
position,3" the guardian was awarded the adjustment from income to
principal.39
The Surrogate in Holloway II relied on "the purely equitable principle
that the burden of income taxes should be charged to the account into which
the taxed item goes .... The tax in fact is attributable to a receipt by the estate
of income for accounting purposes."' 0 The income account of the trust must
assume the tax burden by reimbursing the corpus account for the amount it
has paid. The reimbursement would occur in the trust year following receipt of
the trapping distribution, when presumably some income will have been earned
in the trust. Trust income can be compelled to pay the tax on income earned in
the estate because the ultimate beneficiary of both estate income and trust income is the same person, and all benefits and burdens of both income accounts
fall on that individual. Holloway II holds equity paramount and restores the
balance between income and corpus beneficiaries that was upset by the operation of Subchapter J. As the Surrogate so aptly summed up; "While the Code
provisions may fly in the face of reality, there is no reason for a court concerned with the proper administration of estates to follow suit."4
ing an obligation of trust income as to tax paid on such income, and no equitable adjustment is required for
that portion of the trust's income tax. The parties seeking an adjustment in the Holloway case conceded this
point. Holloway, supra note 8, at 365, 327 N.Y.2d at 868.

"See supra note 29
1167 Misc. 2d at 133, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
Id. at 134, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
11d. at 134, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
1168 Misc. 2d at 362, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
"d. at 366, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
*1ld. at 365, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
4
1ld.
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III. TAX ISSUES
Two income tax questions arise from the Holloway II decision. Both deal
in some way with the trust income [hereinafter referred to as "Holloway income"] that is used to make the Holloway adjustment. First, who is the income
taxpayer for Holloway income? The prime candidates are the income
beneficiary of the trust and the trust itself. As this investigation will show, the
answer is dependent on the local law dealing with the underlying equitable adjustment." In New York, where the local law is the Holloway case, the trust,
and not the beneficiary, should be responsible for the tax on this income. 3
Second, if the beneficiary is not initially liable for the tax on Holloway income, might such liability arise later through the operation of the throwback
rules?" This could occur if the Holloway adjustment is treated as an accumulation of income for which the beneficiary's day of reckoning is postponed only
until the trustee makes an "accumulation distribution"45 from the corpus. The
correct application of the throwback rules, it will be shown, requires the exemption of the simple trust from their operation, saving the beneficiary again
from a tax on Holloway income. 46

IV.

THE IDENTITY OF THE TAXPAYER

In year two of the residuary trust, a portion of the income earned by the
trust is transferred to the principal account as the Holloway adjustment. The
rest of the trust's income is paid out to the income beneficiary, according to the
terms of the will. There is no question that the income beneficiary must pay income tax on the portion of trust income that is distributed.4 7 A more difficult
question is the following: who is the taxpayer for the Holloway income that is
paid over to the trust's principal account?
There are two possible answers. Since the income was earned in the trust
and was not distributed, the trust could be responsible for the income tax. On
the other hand, because the trust is a simple trust, all the income is required to
be distributed to the income beneficiary. Perhaps the income beneficiary,
therefore, is the taxpayer responsible for this tax on the theory that the
Holloway income was in effect distributed to the beneficiary, then paid by the
beneficiary to the trust's principal account. The plausibility of the latter interpretation is bolstered by the fact that although the Holloway adjustment is, as
a practical matter, made from the trust's income account to its principal account, it is intended to adjust the interests of the income and principal
infra text accompanying notes 55-70.
infra text accompanying notes 69 and 70.
"I.R.C. §§ 665-67.
42See
41See

§ 665(b).
"See infra text accompanying notes 116-46.
"See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
41I.R.C.
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beneficiaries."8 The idea that the income used to make the adjustment constructively passes through the income beneficiary's hands is consistent with the
rationale for the adjustment.
The Internal Revenue Service has not taken a published position on the
identity of the taxpayer for Holloway income. 9 Consequently, the question
has not been litigated to date, and there exists no judicial authority. The commentators are split on the question. Professor Casner has advanced the income
beneficiary as the appropriate taxpayer, suggesting that when the trustee
makes the adjustment, the beneficiary is in effect repaying a debt to the trust.
[In a trapping distribution,] the life income beneficiary may be enriched at
the expense of the corpus in that eventually he will receive the estate income on which the income tax was paid by the trust corpus, and if the
trustee does not have discretion to distribute corpus to the life income
beneficiary, the trustee may be required in some appropriate way to reimburse the corpus in the amount of the income tax that has come out of
corpus. If this is done by the trustee's withholding of the necessary
amount out of what would otherwise be trust income required to be
distributed to the life income beneficiary, no income tax should be
payable by the trust as a result of such withholding. The life income
beneficiary should be treated as though he received all the trust income
and then paid a debt owing to the trust, in determining the income tax
consequences of the trust and the income beneficiary."
Jonathan Blattmachr has adopted the view that the trust is the appropriate taxpayer for Holloway income. His reasoning is that the Holloway
adjustment reduces the trust's accounting income, thereby reducing the
amount that is required to be distributed to the beneficiary under the terms of
the will.
If the effect of the Holloway H adjustment is to reduce the amount of accounting income in the year the adjustment is made, the deduction to the
trust and the inclusion in gross income by the beneficiary presumably are
4

1The Surrogate's Court in Holloway 11 quotes with approval the following sentence from another equitable

adjustment decision, In re Bixby's Estate, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 339-40, 295 P.2d 68, 76 (1956):
The ultimate result is salutary in that the reciprocal and correlative rights of all the takers under the
will remain vested in the posture prescribed by the state rules governing rights and interests in the estates of decedents, undisrupted and undisturbed by the transient vagaries of the federal income tax

laws.
68 Misc. 2d at 365-66, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
" 9The Service has ruled privately, in Technical Advice Memoranda 8501011 and 8501084, that the trust is
the proper taxpayer for Holloway income. Both rulings deal with the same trust, which the Service and the
taxpayer agreed was governed by New York law, including the Holloway decision.
I.R.C. § 6110j)(3) provides that Technical Advice Memoranda "may not be used or cited as precedent."
On the authority of private determinations of the Internal Revenue Service, see generally Portney, Letter

Rulings: An Endangered Species? 36 TAX LAW 751 (1983).

"4 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 206-07 (1978 Supp. to Vol. 1). Professor Casner does not mention the
Holloway adjustment in the 5th edition of the ESTATE PLANNING treatise (1983) or in any of the supplements subsequent to the 1978 supplement.
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reduced. The thrust of the Holloway H decision seems to be that the effect
of the adjustment is to reduce the amount of accounting income."
The reduction of accounting income suggested here, while limiting the amount
required to be distributed, cannot affect the amount of income subject to payment of tax by someone. As it is not required to be distributed to the beneficiary, the Holloway income, according to this view, must be taxed to the trust.52
Before pursuing in detail the identity of the taxpayer for Holloway income, it is important to establish what is at stake for the participants. The reader may have observed that regardless of whether the income beneficiary or the
trust is established as the proper taxpayer, the burden of the tax will ultimately
fall on the income beneficiary. This is so because even if the trust pays the tax
on Holloway income, it will be the income account of the trust that will be the
appropriate source for funds to pay the tax.53 By reducing the amount the income beneficiary receives in distributions from the trust, this resolution of the
question places the tax burden squarely on the income beneficiary.
It is the weight of the tax burden, however, that can be different if the tax
is paid by the trust. The trust may be in a lower income tax bracket than the in5

Blattmachr, The Tax Effects of Equitable Adjustments: An Internal Revenue Code Odyssey, 18 INST. ON
EST. PLAN. 14-19 (1984).
2
1d. This reasoning was adopted by the Service in two Technical Advice Memoranda, Nos. 8501011 and
8501084, both of which dealt with the same trust. See supra note 49.
3
See supra authorities cited in note 28.
The obligation of the trust income account to pay this tax on Holloway income presents again (and
perhaps again and again) the question of the identity of the taxpayer for income that is not actually
distributed to the income beneficiary.
The scenario is as follows: The trapping distribution is made from the estate to the trust in year one of the
trust. The distribution creates an income tax liability that is discharged by trust corpus for lack of any income in the trust at that early date. In year two, when the trust does have income, the trustee makes a
Holloway adjustment to reimburse corpus from the income account. In year three, assuming the trust is the
appropriate taxpayer for Holloway income, the trustee is faced with an income tax obligation (on April 15 if
it is a calendar year trust) for the income retained in the trust in year two as the adjustment. The trustee uses
income earned in the first three months of year three to pay this tax. Therefore, all of the year three income
is not distributed. Furthermore, to the extent it is not, the trust presumably is liable for income tax on it, due
in April of year four. Payment of this tax will create a tax obligation for the trust in year five, and so on.
Nonetheless, the pocket from which each year's tax is paid is in effect the income beneficiary's, through a
reduction of income distributions each year exactly equal to the tax paid by the trust. The beneficiary may
be quite satisfied to have the trust incur these multiple rounds of income tax, which utilize the trust's low
and declining tax brackets rather than his or her own higher brackets.
A slightly more complex problem, that of multiple Holloway adjustments, arises if on April 15 of year
three the trust has insufficient funds in its income account to pay the income tax on the Holloway income
from year two (perhaps because trust corpus is invested in bonds which pay interest only after April 15, or
because the income from the first three months of year three was distributed on March 31 to the income
beneficiary in a quarterly distribution required by the instrument). The trustee is obliged in year three to use
trust corpus to pay the tax on the Holloway income. Clearly, a second Holloway adjustment is necessary
later in year three to reimburse corpus for this payment. The income used to make the year three Holloway
adjustment will generate an income tax to the trust for year three. If on April, I5 of year four the trust is
again without income to pay the tax for year three, the trustee must use corpus again, necessitating a year
four Holloway adjustment and triggering a year four income tax to the trust, and so on. Again, the
beneficiary enjoys the benefit of having the tax on part of several years' trust income paid by the trust at the
trust's low and declining tax brackets.
On multiple Holloway adjustments, see Blattmachr, The Tax Effects of Equitable Adjustments: An Internal Revenue Code Odyssey, 18 INST. ON EST. PLAN. n. 102 and accompanying text (1984).
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come beneficiary. Furthermore, even if both the trust and the individual are in
their respective top tax brackets, the use of the trust as an additional taxpayer
provides a second "ride" up the tax brackets, allowing some income to be taxed
in each of the lower brackets.54 A conclusion that the trust, rather than the
beneficiary, is the proper taxpayer for Holloway income almost invariably will
result in a lower total tax bill on income all of which, after taxes, will come to
rest in the hands of the beneficiary.
A. A Reduction of Income
The starting point, and it may seem to be the ending point, of the inquiry
into the proper taxpayer for trust income transferred to the principal account
as a Holloway adjustment is Section 652(a) of the Code. Section 652(a) requires
the income beneficiary of a simple trust to include in gross income the amount
of the trust's income required to be distributed currently, "whether distributed
or not." 5 This would seem to terminate the investigation abruptly because it
apparently makes no difference whether the Holloway income is distributed.
The Code appears to make the income beneficiary the taxpayer, no matter
what the trustee does.
One means of avoiding this conclusion would be to characterize Holloway
income as something other than trust accounting income. That is, trust accounting income is reduced by the amount of the Holloway adjustment - the
argument attributed to Blattmachr previously noted.56
The Code at Section 643(b) uses the unadorned term "income" to refer to
trust accounting income and defines it as the trust's income for the year "determined under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law."5 7
The question whether the Holloway adjustment reduces trust accounting income could be restated: does "applicable local law," in the form of the
Holloway decision, redefine a portion of the trust's income as principal?
When the Holloway adjustment is made, the income transferred to the
trust's principal account unquestionably becomes principal. However, it cannot be denied that the amounts transferred were originally accounting income.
New York's Principal and Income Act58 is the "applicable local law" which in
the first instance defines accounting income for New York trusts as "the
return in money or property derived from the use of principal."59 The law provides examples of income, including dividends, interest, and rents. 6 The
-4This effect results from the fact that whatever a taxpayer's marginal tax rate, portions of the taxpayer's income are taxed in each of the tax brackets below the marginal rate. See I.R.C. § l(a)-(e).
51.R.C. § 652(a).
16See supra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying text.
57.R.C.

§ 643(b).

"N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.1 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1986).
"Id. at § l1-2.1(b)(l).
6
ld.at § 11-2. 1(b)(l)(A) - (1).
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Holloway decision is no less "applicable local law" than the Principal and Income Act, but the decision does not hold that certain dividends, interest, and
rents are not accounting income. It merely requires that they be paid over to
the principal account. 61 The Surrogate in Holloway H directed an "adjustment
from income to principal. 62
A return to Subchapter J, however, reveals that the interpretation of the
Holloway adjustment as reducing accounting income is conceptually correct,
though a bit inaccurately presented. Section 652(a) does not measure the
amounts includible in the beneficiary's gross income from bare trust accounting income, which in Internal Revenue Code parlance would be referred to
simply as "income. "63 Rather, the amount includible for the beneficiary is "the
6
amount of income for the taxable year required to be distributed currently.1
The phrase contains the word "income," meaning trust accounting income determined under the instrument and applicable local law. However, it limits inclusion to the amount of "income" that is required to be distributed currently.
By definition, simple trusts are required by their instruments to distribute
all their accounting income currently. 6 Therefore, ordinarily no distinction is
drawn between trust accounting income and "income required to be distributed currently." But, their coincidence is not always perfect. The most common
exception is where the governing instrument requires the trustee to withhold
annually a portion of accounting income for a depreciation reserve. 66 In such
cases, the withheld income becomes principal. 67 The amount of trust accounting income earned by the trust is not affected by such a provision; only "income required to be distributed currently" is reduced, and with it the trust's
distribution deduction 6 and the amount for inclusion in the beneficiary's gross
income.
The Holloway adjustment must be seen as analogous to a depreciation
reserve. The income transferred to corpus is genuine trust accounting income
within the meaning of the Principal and Income Act. But as with a depreciation reserve, it cannot be said that the Holloway income is "required to be
distributed currently." It is expressly required by the Holloway decision not to
"68 Misc. 2d at 366, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
"Id. (emphasis added).
"See I.R.C. § 643(b).
'I.R.C. § 652(a).
"1.R.C. § 651(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-I.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.651 (a)-2(a). The regulations provide that "the retention of current income for [a depreciation reserve] will not disqualify the trust from being a 'simple' trust." Id.
"The purpose of such a reserve is to replace corpus that has been lost through wear and tear, or as the
regulations state it, "keeping the trust corpus intact." Id. As with the Holloway adjustment, the income
amounts that go into a depreciation reserve are not "corpus" as they are earned. Rather, funds are transferred from income to corpus.
"The distribution deduction, like the beneficiary's income, is measured by income "required to be distributed
currently." Compare I.R.C. §§ 651(a) and 652(a).
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be distributed." Therefore, the "amount of income for the taxable year required to be distributed currently" within the meaning of Sections 65 1(a) and
652(a) is reduced by the Holloway adjustment. 0 The trust's distribution deduction and the beneficiary's gross income inclusion are reduced by the amount of
the adjustment. The result is that the trust, and not the beneficiary, is the proper taxpayer for Holloway income.
B. A Mandatory or Permissive Adjustment?
It is fundamental that the Holloway adjustment be mandatory. If the adjustment were merely permissive, the amount of income requiredto be distributed would not be affected. In the absence of a mandatory rule, any such adjustment made by a trustee could be described best as the voluntary repayment
of a debt owed by the income beneficiary to trust corpus, the view proposed by
9

A distinction that may seem pertinent between the depreciation reserve example in the regulations and the
Holloway adjustment is the source of the requirement that income be withheld. In the reserve example, the
requirement is imposed by the trust's governing instrument. Treas. Reg. § 1.651 (a)-2(a). The Holloway adjustment, on the other hand, is imposed by local law, viz., the Holloway decision. This difference may appear to have real significance in light of the definition of a simple trust in I.R.C. § 65 1(a)(I), which provides
that the requirement that all the trust's income be distributed currently must be found specifically in the
terms of the trust instrument. The question is raised whether "local law" can ever be a determinant of the
amount of income required to be distributed under § 651. If it can not, then the Holloway adjustment does
not reduce such income, and the beneficiary should be treated as receiving all of it.
However, it is not the classification of the trust as a simple trust, the subject of § 65 ](a)(I), which is at issue here. The issue involves the measurement of the trust's distribution deduction, for which § 651 (a) makes
a second mention of "income required to be distributed currently," this time in the flush language following
§ 651(a)(2). Of equal concern is the measurement of the beneficiary's gross income inclusion, in § 652(a),
where income required to be distributed currently isagain the standard. In both of these latter two instances,
and unlike § 651(a)(I), income required to be distributed is not further qualified as income required by the
terms of the instrument to be distributed.
Therefore, for purposes of measuring the distribution deduction and the beneficiary's income, although
not for determining whether a trust is a simple trust, applicable local law is pertinent to the "requirement" to
distribute all income currently. In the form of the Holloway decision, local law reduces the amount required
to be distributed currently by requiring that a portion of current income be paid instead to corpus. The trust
is still a simple trust because the trust instrument requires that all the income be distributed currently. The
fact that local law supersedes the terms of the instrument as to amounts actually to be distributed in the year
of the adjustment does not alter the terms of the instrument, which continue to qualify the trust as a simple
trust.
For the same reason, the reference to "applicable local law" in the first sentence of Treas. Reg. § 1.65 I(a)2(a) is not without authority in the Code. That sentence states: "The determination of whether trust income
is required to be distributed currently depends upon the terms of the trust instrument and the applicable
local law." The reference is to the second mention in Code § 65 1(a) of income required to be distributed currently, not to the definition of simple trusts in § 65 1(a)(1). This conclusion is consistent with the existence of
a separate section in the regulations dealing with the definition of simple trusts, Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-1.
An important consequence is that a depreciation or depletion reserve required by local law, but not by the
trust instrument, would have exactly the same effect as would either a reserve required by the instrument or
the Holloway adjustment: income required to be distributed currently would be reduced, as would the
distribution deduction and the beneficiary's income, but the trust would continue to qualify under its terms
and under § 651(a)(1) as a simple trust.
7
Revenue Ruling 85-116, 1985-31 I.R.B. 19, contains an instance where income required to be distributed is
increased by "applicable local law," the reverse of the Holloway situation. The trust described in the ruling
had disposed of (by corporate liquidation) underproductive property in the form of shares of stock in a corporation that had paid very little or no dividends during the trust term. State trust law, as interpreted by the
state's Surrogate's Court, required the trustee to distribute part of the liquidation proceeds to the income
beneficiary to compensate for its failure to make the property productive earlier.
The Service ruled that the distribution is income required to be distributed currently under applicable
local law. To the extent the distribution consists of capital gains from the liquidation, the distribution is included in the trust's DNI and therefore in the beneficiary's gross income. Id.
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Casner as previously noted.7 Therefore, the beneficiary would be the proper
taxpayer for Holloway income. There follows a consideration first of the
Holloway adjustment's claim to mandatory status, and second of the tax treatment of such adjustments in jurisdictions where there is no mandatory rule.
1. The Estate of Bosch Problem
The Surrogate in Holloway II expressed the ruling in mandatory language." The Holloway adjustment is regarded by New York fiduciaries and
their counsel as a requirement, and not merely an option." Despite the mandatory force of the ruling for trustees subject to New York law, however, the attitude of a federal court deciding the question of the proper taxpayer for Holloway income is far from certain. Since the Supreme Court decided Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch74 in 1967, federal courts deciding tax controversies have

not been obliged to regard state trial court decisions as controlling for purposes
of defining property rights and obligations to which federal tax rules apply."
The Supreme Court in Estate of Bosch ruled that only decisions of the highest
court of each state define incontrovertably the common law of each state. The
rationale of the ruling was to head off taxpayers' use of nonadversary proceedings and even collusive suits in lower state courts to obtain adjudications
6
of their rights for the sole purpose of affecting their tax treatment.'
[Tihe underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and the
State's highest court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no
decision by that court, then federal authorities must apply what they find
to be the state law after giving "proper regard" to relevant rulings of other
courts of the State."
The Surrogate Court's Holloway H decision, then, is entitled to only
"proper regard" by the Tax Court, the Claims Court, or a Federal District
Court deciding an income tax case. Any such federal court that determines
that Holloway H does not represent the law of New York as the New York
"See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
"The holding in Holloway II is as follows: "[Tlhe prior decision is modified by sustaining the objection of the
guardian ad litem and directing that the adjustment from income to principal, the extent to which has been
agreed upon in the papers, be made." 68 Misc. 2d at 366, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869. If there was any doubt as to
the mandatory effect of the Holloway H ruling, it was dispelled by the holding in In re Will of Coe, 80 Misc.
2d 374, 363 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sur. Ct. 1975), decided by Surrogate John D. Bennett, the author of both
Holloway opinions. "[Tjhe fiduciary should not be surcharged for exercising its discretion in not having the
principal account reimbursed for the taxes paid (EPTL 11-2.1) in view of the fact that Matter of Holloway

was not decided when the taxes were paid." Id. at 381, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 27 1. A fair inference is that trustees
could be surcharged for failing to make the Holloway adjustment in cases arising after Holloway I!.
"See Carrico & Bondurant, EquitableAdjustments: A Survey and Analysis of Precedents and Practice, 36
TAX LAw. app. p. 614 item 3(b), p. 625 n. 53 (1983).

"387 U.S. 456 (1967).
"Id. at 465.

"The majority in Estate of Bosch was convinced that the state court adjudications before it were obtained
"for the purpose of directly affecting federal estate tax liability." Id. at 463.
77Id.
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Court of Appeals would define it, could decide that the proper level of regard
for Holloway H is none at all. The "mandatory" adjustment under state law
for New York fiduciaries could be deemed merely discretionary for purposes of
federal taxation.
An Estate of Bosch ruling against the validity of a lower state court's decision can result in tax treatment that diverges materially from the economics of
the transaction being taxed. For instance, a New York trustee would be no less
subject to the state law requirement of Holloway H to transfer part of the
trust's income to the principal account simply because a federal court ruled in a
tax case that New York law requires no adjustment, and that New York law
requires the trustee to distribute all the trust's income to the beneficiary. Only
the taxpayers' payment of income tax would conform to the federal court's
reading8 of New York law, not their actual behavior as to the trust and its income.

7

An effort can be made to predict what a federal court giving Holloway H
"proper regard" would conclude. The decision has at least two strikes against
it. First, Holloway II directly contradicts the Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act (Principal and Income Act), which has been enacted in New
York.79 The Principal and Income Act requires that trustees pay from principal
"any tax levied upon profits, gain or other receipts allocated to principal notwithstanding denomination of the tax as an income tax by the taxing authority."80 There can be little doubt that the income tax on a trapping distribution of
estate corpus is a tax on "other receipts allocated to principal." Thus, it would
seem that the payment of the tax from trust principal was proper under the
Principal and Income Act. On this basis, the Surrogate had decided in
Holloway I that no adjustment from income to principal for the tax is required." In Holloway II, the Surrogate did not ignore the Principal and Income Act but restated the rationale for its first decision: "Unquestionably a
literal interpretation of 'other receipts' would include principal distributions to
testamentary trusts as here which are only 'deemed' income by the Internal
Revenue Code."8 However, in Holloway II, "the purely equitable principle
"See Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 470 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
9
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.1 (McKinney 1967).
8
1d. at § I I-2.l(l)(4)(C) (emphasis added); see also Uniform Principal and Income Act (1962) § 13(c)(4).
"167 Misc. 2d at 133-34, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 535. The Holloway case involved trapping distributions made in
1959, prior to the adoption in New York of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act in 1965, without
retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the Surrogate in Holloway I found that the 1965 law codifed prior New
York decisions requiring payment of income tax on corpus items from the corpus account. Therefore, there
would be no distinction between Holloway and a case arising under the Principal and Income Act:

lElven though the expense was incurred prior to the effective date of the Principal and Income Act,
the fact that the Legislature has seen fit to adopt the above mentioned rule and that it is in effect a
codification of prior case law would seem to preclude any argument that the trustees were

unreasonable in not making the allocation urged by the guardian ad litem.
Id. at 134, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 535 (citation omitted).

'168 Misc. 2d at 364, 327 N.YS.2d at 868.
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that the burden of income taxes should be charged to the account into which
the taxed item goes"83 outweighed the rather imprecise reference to "other
receipts" in the Principal and Income Act. The reasoning of Holloway II, based
on equity between the two classes of beneficiaries, can certainly stand on its
own. A federal court giving "proper regard" to the case, however, might
reasonably conclude that the New York Court of Appeals would adhere more
strictly to the Principal and Income Act.
A second infirmity of Holloway H in any "proper regard" determination
would be the fact that Holloway II, unlike Holloway I, was a nonadversary
proceeding. On reargument, the trustees, who had won in Holloway I, declined
to take any position."4 The guardian ad litem, who had initiated the proceedings by objecting to the trustees' final account, requested the reargument 5
The New York State Bankers Association (Trust Division) filed an amicus
curiae brief in support of the guardian's position. 6 The Surrogate in Holloway
II twice cites the pre-Holloway practice of "most corporate fiduciaries" of making the adjustment from income to principal, even though not required to by
statute or decision.87 The appearance, in Holloway II, of a desire shared by all
participants to salvage a long-time practice among local trust departments and
counsel is, for better or worse, difficult to overlook. It is particularly damaging
for a "proper regard" determination that when both sides of the controversy
were actively represented, in Holloway I, the trustees prevailed, while the
guardian succeeded only when the trustees chose not to respond.
Standards for federal courts giving "proper regard" to lower state court
decisions under Estate of Bosch are nonexistent. The cases have come out
both ways, i.e., some lower state court decisions have been followed and some
ignored. 9 But even given the uncertainty of the rule stated by the Supreme
Court and even acknowledging the two negative aspects of Holloway II men83

1d. at 365, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.

"Id. at 362, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
5

9 1d.
MId.

811d.

"See, e.g., R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S.
1983); M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND, & R.
BENEFICIARIES 47 (1970).

LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION

4-67 (5th ed.

STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND

"Lower state court decrees were not followed by federal courts in, inter alia, Estate of Selby v. United States,

726 F.2d 643, 645-48 (10th Cir. 1984); Hunter v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 1293, 1297 (W.D. Pa. 1984);
Lake Shore Nat'l Bank v. Coyle, 296 F. Supp. 412, 417-18 (N.D. 111.1968), rev d on other grounds, 419 F. 2d
958 (7th Cir. 1970); Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089, 1092-93 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Schmidt v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 811, 815-16 (D. Kan. 1968); and Lakewood Plantation, Inc. v. United States, 272 F.
Supp. 290, 294 (D.S.C. 1967). The lower state court decisions were followed in proper regard determinations

in, inter alia, Harris v. Lukhard, 733 F.2d 1075, 1082 (4th Cir. 1984)(a non-tax case); Estate of Fulmer v.
Comm'r, 83 T.C. 302, 306-308 (1984); and Underwood v. United States, 407 F. 2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1969).
In Mass v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 112 (1983), the Tax Court followed a lower state court ruling obtained by the

taxpayer before the Tax Court, while rejecting prior rulings of lower courts in the same state on the same
issue. Id. at 125-27. Undoubtedly, there have been numerous sub silentio proper regard determinations
where federal courts have followed state court decrees but have not raised the issue in written opinions.
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tioned above," the odds in favor of a federal court's following Holloway II in a
tax dispute are high. Addressing the first problem cited above,9 the fact that
the Surrogate gave greater weight to equitable principles than to the Principal
and Income Act should be of no concern to a federal court. Federal courts do
have a legitimate concern to prevent taxpayers from engaging in collusive state
court litigation for the sole purpose of affecting their federal tax liability. On
the other hand, federal courts deciding tax cases generally are not, nor should
they be, concerned to assure the "proper" development of the common law in
the several states.
As to the nonadversary nature of the second Holloway proceeding,92 this
should not be a barrier to a federal court's following of the rule of the case for
two reasons. First, whatever motives the parties may have had, affecting their
tax liability cannot have been one of them. The guardian ad litem, who initiated the proceedings and requested the reargument, as well as the remaindermen he represented, sought no tax benefit from the Holloway adjustment. The guardian was seeking a "refund" of income taxes paid by corpus,
but not a refund from the government, rather from the income account on
whose behalf corpus had paid the tax. There was no question before the state
court that would affect the total amount of tax liability. That was established
and had long been paid. 3 The trustees, who took no position on reargument,
stood only to bear additional taxes as a result of the Holloway adjustment. If
the trust is the taxpayer for the Holloway income, the trust will pay an income
tax, where, as a simple trust, it likely would have owed nothing in the absence
of the adjustment. 4 A federal court could never say of Holloway 11, as the
Supreme Court said in Estate of Bosch, that the "state proceedings were
brought for the purpose of directly affecting federal ... tax liability."'95
A second factor that may reduce the impact of the nonadversarial nature
of the Holloway II proceeding is the fact that in any future federal tax controversy, it will not be the Holloway parties but some other taxpayers who will
be before the federal court. In Estateof Bosch and many of its progeny to date,
"See supra text accompanying notes 79-87.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
".See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
"It is no doubt true that the use of a trapping distribution in itself affected the total tax liability of the estate,
the trust, and the income beneficiary considered together. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
However, the Holloway case did not deal with the question of whether trapping distributions can be made,
but with the question of who bears the burden of income tax following a trapping distribution.
".,e supra note 24 and accompanying text.
"387 U.S. at 463. It might be suggested that the trustees in Holloway // were acting in the interests of the income beneficiary of the trusts, who could very well have saved income taxes as a result of the adjustment.
See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. For two reasons, this contention does not render the Holloway

case "tax-motivated." First, the income beneficiary simply did not participate in the controversy. Attributing
her interests to the trustees can only be purely conjectural. Second, the trustees did not initiate the proceedings. Therefore even if they had the income beneficiary's tax interests in mind, these cannot have been
the reason the proceedings were initiated.
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the issue has been whether a state trial court decision involving the taxpayer
before the federal court was controlling.9 6The reach of Estate of Bosch certainly extends beyond cases where the taxpayer before the federal court has obtained a lower state court ruling affecting his tax liability.97 The Supreme
Court's holding was simply that in the absence of a decision by the state's
highest court, a federal court must determine the state's law as the highest
court of the state would find it. This determination must be made giving "proper regard" to decisions by "other courts of the State," without limitation to
decisions involving the taxpayer before the court.98 Nonetheless, a federal
court is naturally more likely to be offended by a lower state court ruling obtained by the taxpayer before it in a nonadversary proceeding and for the purpose of affecting tax liability. This will not be the case for future taxpayers
relying on the Holloway H decision.
The chances that Holloway H would survive a "proper regard" inquiry
are not as bleak as they might first appear, and can even be described as good.
Thus, for a federal court, Holloway H should represent the law of New York
even though it is not a decision of the state's highest court. For the time being,
it appears that the Holloway adjustment is indeed mandatory for trustees in
New York for state law and federal tax purposes. As a mandatory adjustment,
it reduces "income required to be distributed," and also the amount which the
income beneficiary must include in gross income.
2. Other Jurisdictions
The question remains whether a "Holloway" adjustment is mandatory in
states other than New York. One state, Michigan, by statute prohibits all
equitable adjustments.99 In no other jurisdiction is there any decision or statute
addressing the need for an adjustment from trust income to principal in the
context of a trapping distribution."° A 1983 joint study by the American Bar
Association and the American College of Probate Counsel established that in
only six states, aside from New York, "Holloway"adjustments are made as a
"See, e.g., Estate of Selby v. United States, 726 F.2d 643, 645-48 (10th Cir. 1984); Underwood v. United
States, 407 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1969); Lake Shore Nat'l Bank v. Coyle, 296 F. Supp. 412, 417-18 IND.
III. 1968).
"See, e.g., Harris v. Lukhard, 733 F.2d 1075, 1082 (4th Cir. 1984); Hunter v. United States, 597 F. Supp.
1293, 1297 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Estate of Fulmer v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 302, 306-308 (1984); Mass v. Comm'r, 81
T.C. 112, 125-27 (1983).

"387 U.S. at 465.
"MIC.H COMP. LAWS § 700.829(2). The provision is in pertinent part as follows:
iWihere the applicable provisions of the internal revenue code confer a benefit or impose a detriment
upon a trust or estate or persons designated to benefit from a trust or estate, a trustee or personal

representative shall not restore an interest to the position otherwise contemplated by the person having authority to act in respect to that interest through adjustment between income and principal.
Id.
'.'Carrico & Bondurant, Equitable Adjustments: A Survey and Analysis of Precedents and Practice, 36 TAX
LAW. 545, 606, 608, 610, 612, 614, 616, 618, item 3(a) app. (1983).
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matter of practice. 0 1 It may be assumed that on occasion trustees in other
states make such adjustments in the interest of fairness among beneficiaries.
The tax question considered above regarding the adjustment in New York
must be raised again for all other jurisdictions: who is the taxpayer for income
transferred to the principal account for the Holloway adjustment? As in the
discussion of this question for New York trusts, the key to the answer is the
answer to another question: is the adjustment mandatory under state law? If it
is not mandatory, then the adjustment can be seen as a voluntary repayment
of a debt to the trust's principal account by the income beneficiary, who would
then properly pay the tax on the income used for the adjustment.' If the adjustment is mandatory, then it is accurate to say that "income required to be
distributed" to the beneficiary is reduced by applicable local law. Therefore,
the trust, rather than the beneficiary, should be the taxpayer.' 3
Where state law is silent, a Holloway adjustment would be merely permissive. The adjustment would certainly not be prohibited. A trustee could not
very well be surcharged for taking the initiative to correct the imbalance between the interests of income and principal beneficiaries resulting from the income tax payment from corpus.0 4 Nor would a trustee be in the wrong for failing to make an adjustment in the absence of a pre-existing judicial or statutory
requirement. Even in New York, a trustee in one case was absolved from
liability for not making a Holloway adjustment because the case arose before
the Holloway II decision.' 5
The question of the identity of the taxpayer for Holloway income,
therefore, has two answers. In New York, where the adjustment is mandatory,
the trust is properly the taxpayer. In other jurisdictions, where state law to
date is silent and the adjustment consequently is merely permissive, the income
beneficiary of the trust is the appropriate taxpayer, despite the fact that the
Holloway income never reaches that individual.0 6 The rationale, again, is that
the income beneficiary has used the Holloway income to repay a debt to the
principal account of the trust, which has paid an income tax obligation of the
1111d. at 606, 610, 612, 616, item 3(b) app. The six states are Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Nevada,
Oregon, and Rhode Island.
'See supra text accompanying note 50.
"'See supra text accompanying note 5 I.
"'in Holloway , which held that an adjustment was not required, the Surrogate remarked in dictum:
This is not to infer [sic], however, that the trustees would necessarily have been found imprudent had
they made the allocation urged by the guardian ad litem provided they were authorized under the will
to make such discretionary allocations, since the court will not interfere with an allocation even
though it might have exercised the discretion differently in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
67 Misc. 2d at 134, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 535 [citations omitted]. It is unclear whether the discretion referred to
by the Surrogate would have to be affirmatively granted to the trustee by the instrument or merely not
denied the trustee by the instrument.
'"'In re Will of Coe, 80 Misc. 2d 374, 381, 363 N.Y.S.2d 265, 271 (Sur. Ct. 1975).
""In Michigan, the question of the identity of the taxpayer for Holloway income cannot arise because the
adjustment is prohibited by statute. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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income account.'0 7
3. The Prognosis for More Holloways
New York will remain alone in the "mandatory adjustment" camp only
until another state court or legislature imposes a Holloway adjustment requirement on trustees. It is worthwhile to consider briefly the likelihood that a "Holloway bandwagon" will develop, by examining the considerations a probate
court or state legislature faces in deciding whether to require an adjustment.
The most obvious hurdle to a Holloway requirement in a majority of
states018 is the provision, previously quoted," 9 in the Revised Uniform Principal
and Income Act. This provision requires that funds to pay income taxes on
items of accounting principal must come from the principal account." 0 The
Holloway H decision demonstrated persuasively that considerations of fairness
among beneficiaries can override this requirement. The inequity created by the
use of corpus to pay income tax in the trapping distribution context is real. A
court can justifiably conclude that the drafters of the Principal and Income
Act did not have this situation in mind when the provision was framed. The
Principal and Income Act will be useful primarily for a court that is determined not to require a Holloway adjustment and is seeking to amass authority
for that position.
On the other side, a probate court must decide whether the fiduciary duty
of impartiality impels a trustee to make a Holloway adjustment. In its broadest
statement of the duty of impartiality, the Restatement Second of Trusts expresses the rule as follows: "When there are two or more beneficiaries of a
trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them.""' Dealing impartially with income and corpus beneficiaries, it can be argued, invariably requires reimbursing the corpus account when it pays taxes on income never
received by the corpus beneficiaries. The Holloway II case was decided on
grounds of the duty of impartiality,"' though without express citation. For a
number of reasons, however, a court in another jurisdiction would be justified
in concluding that the duty of impartiality does not lead inexorably to the
Holloway adjustment.
'See supra text accompanying note 50.
"The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act has been adopted in 29 states. 7B U.L.A. 145 (1985).
"See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
"'Uniform Principal and Income Act (1962) § 13(c)(4), 7B U.L.A. 177 (1983).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959). In expressing the duty of impartiality, another section of
the Restatement refers more specifically to the competing interests of income and corpus beneficiaries: "If a
trust is created for beneficiaries in succession, the trustee is under a duty to the successive beneficiaries to act
with due regard to their respective interests." Id. at § 232. See also A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 183
and 232 (3d ed. 1967).
"'The Surrogate's "purely equitable principle that the burden of income taxes should be charged to the account into which the taxed item goes," 68 Misc. 2d at 365, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869, is nothing more than the
trustee's duty not to discriminate against the remaindermen for the benefit of the income beneficiary, i.e.,
the duty of impartiality.
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The duty of impartiality expresses the presumed intent of all testators and
grantors that their fiduciaries act fairly as between the various trust
beneficiaries. On the other hand, testators have other intentions, both presumed and expressed, which may conflict with the intent underlying the duty
of impartiality. For instance, it can be presumed that testators in general desire
an expedient administration of their probate affairs. The desire for quick and
efficient administration is generally strong enough that testators would be willing to accept a limited amount of inequity among benficiaries if necessary to
avoid complicated and time-consuming adjustments." 3 Nor are testators the
only group with an interest in promoting swift and easy administration of
estates. Probate judges, perhaps more than anyone, recognize the costs of complexity. On grounds of efficiency alone, a court could decide that a Holloway
adjustment is not required by the duty of impartiality.
A related consideration is the fact that in many situations where a
Holloway adjustment could be made, the amounts involved are small."' Such
instances are unlikely ever to reach a court, as all parties may be satisfied to
avoid the trouble of making an adjustment, if they are even aware of the issue.
Furthermore, even in a case where the adjustment would be large, a court
might be hesitant to rule in favor of an adjustment. It might be unwilling to impose such a requirement on all trusts, including those for which the adjustment
would be too small to justify the time and effort required of the trustee. A
more sensible rule, in many judicial minds, might be to permit trustees to make
the adjustment where they feel the amounts involved call for an adjustment,
while allowing trustees to forego the adjustment in less compelling cases. That
is, the status quo in most jurisdictions, in which the adjustment is neither required nor forbidden, may be the most appealing alternative.
Another factor that may compete with testators' general intention to treat
beneficiaries equitably is an actual preference for one group of beneficiaries."'
In most testamentary plans where there are successive beneficiaries, the income beneficiaries are the primary objects of the testator's bounty. In vast
numbers of such plans, the income beneficiary is the testator's surviving
spouse. Remaindermen often are named as simply "issue per stirpes." Courts
may be reluctant to order an adjustment that will reduce the benefits paid to
these favored income beneficiaries. It may not seem an egregious wrong, for instance, if the children's remainder interest on one or two occasions pays part of
the tax on their mother's income interest. Such considerations surely prevent
some potential Holloway cases from ever becoming disputes and could enter
the balance where the question is litigated to persuade a court not to order an
adjustment.
..See Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine of Equitable Adjustment, 66 IOWA L. REV. 273, 287-88 (198 1).

"'See id. at 288.
"'See id. at 289.

1986]

FIDUCIARY INCOME TAXATION

In short, though the trustee's duty of impartiality might seem to require a
Holloway adjustment in every instance where one could be made, several competing considerations, all based on the presumed intent of testators in general,
counsel a permissive, rather than a mandatory, approach. There is certainly no
guarantee that courts outside New York, if faced with the Holloway question,
will follow the New York answer.
The consequence for the tax issue concerning the identity of the taxpayer
for Holloway income is that two different rules are likely to persist. In New
York and in other jurisdictions that may follow its example on the need for the
adjustment, the trust will properly pay the tax on the income transferred to
principal. In states where no ruling has been made or where the Holloway adjustment may be repudiated, the income beneficiary should be liable for the
tax.
V. THE THROWBACK RULES

Having concluded that where the Holloway adjustment is mandatory
under state law, the beneficiary cannot be taxed currently with the trust income used to make the adjustment, the question remains whether the
beneficiary can be taxed with this income in some future year through the
operation of the throwback rules" 6 of Subchapter J.The throwback rules are
intended to assure that the income beneficiary, and not the trust, is the
ultimate taxpayer for income that is accumulated in a trust rather than
distributed currently." 7 The rules accomplish this by requiring a beneficiary to
pay a tax on trust accumulations in the year they are ultimately distributed.
The tax is imposed in a manner designed to approximate the income tax effect
such amounts would have had if currently distributed each year."' A brief
outline of the throwback rules follows.
In a year in which a trust" 9 does not distribute all of its DNI, the income
which is retained in the trust becomes, under the Code, "undistributed net income" (UNI).20 When, in a subsequent year, the trustee makes a distribution
in excess of that year's DNI, the UNI is deemed to pass out to the beneficiary
as an "accumulation distribution."'' The Code treats an accumulation
distribution as a distribution on the last day of the earliest taxable year for
"61.R.C. §§ 665-67.
"'See Treas. Reg. § 1.665(a)-OA(a)(I).
"'See Treas. Reg. § 1.665(a)-OA(a)(4). On the operation of the throwback rules, see generally A. MICHAELSON & J. BLATrMACHR, INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS 33-47 (11 th ed. 1980).
"'The throwback rules apply only to trusts. They do not apply to estates. I.R.C. § 666(a).
IaUNI is defined as the amount of DNI for any taxable year minus amounts actually distributed and minus
income taxes paid by the trust on the undistributed income. I.R.C. § 665(a). The latter subtraction is
necessary to reflect the fact that part of any accumulation of income must be used to pay the trust's income
tax on that income and, therefore, cannot remain in a trust's "UNI account."
I.R.C. §§ 665(b), 666(a).
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which the trust had UNI. If the accumulation distribution exceeds the UNI for
the earliest year, the excess is treated as a distribution on the last day of the
next earliest year in which the trust had UNI, and so on, until the accumulation distribution has been completely allocated ("thrown back") to years in
which income was accumulated.' The process of allocating accumulation
distributions to prior years is designed to recreate the tax environment as it
would have existed had all income been distributed currently in those years.
The beneficiary, who is thus deemed to have received distributions on the
last day of one or more preceding taxable years, is not required to amend prior
income tax returns to include the additional income. Rather, the beneficiary
must compute a special tax on the accumulated income, payable along with
the income tax for the year in which the accumulation distribution is made.'23
By a complicated averaging method,"' the approximate amount of additional
tax the beneficiary would have paid in prior years had the UNI been
distributed is added to the beneficiary's income tax for the year of the accumulation distribution." 5
The effect of this belated payment by the beneficiary of tax on belated
distributions of accumulated income is to reduce the appeal of accumulation
trusts as a tax-saving device. Any attempt by grantors and trustees to take advantage of the low tax brackets of trusts'26 in order to accumulate income for
future distribution to high-bracket beneficiaries for the most part will be
thwarted. When the accumulated income is distributed, the throwback rules
assure that a tax will be paid in roughly the amount that in preceding years
was saved.
VI.

THE THROWBACK RULES AND SIMPLE TRUSTS

The relevance of the throwback rules to trapping distributions and the
Holloway adjustment may not be immediately evident, in light of the limitation of the Holloway discussion to estate distributions to simple trusts. An accumulation trust by definition cannot be a simple trust. A simple trust is required by its governing instrument to distribute all its income currently. 7 A
grantor who wishes to accumulate income in a trust will create a complex trust
rather than a simple trust. Nevertheless, there are a few occasions when it is
1221.R.C. § 666(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.666(a)-IA(a), (b).
'23 .R.C. § 667(a), (b)(l).
'2 4I.R.C. § 667(b)(I).
1251.R.C. § 667(a)(1), (2).
2
'The income tax brackets for trusts roughly parallel those for individuals, and both have a top marginal
rate of 50%. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. §§ l(a)(3) and § l(c)(3) with § l(e)(3). However, portions of the taxable income of trusts even in the top bracket are taxed at the lower rates on the rate schedule, ranging from 11% to
49%. It is these "low brackets" of even very large trusts that provide opportunities for tax savings through
income-splitting.
27
1 1.R.C. § 651(a)(1).
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appropriate for the throwback rules to apply to simple trusts.'28 For instance, a
simple trust holding shares in companies which have paid extraordinary
dividends may act much like an accumulation trust. This is because such
dividends may be deemed income for tax purposes,'29 while under local law or
the trust instrument the trustee may be entitled to treat them as principal for
trust accounting purposes. 3 ' Thus, items of taxable income are "accumulated"
in corpus. Upon any subsequent corpus distribution, it is appropriate that the
beneficiary pay a throwback tax.
Perhaps because of the difficulty of foreseeing all of the circumstances in
which a simple trust can act as an accumulation trust, Congress left the task of
defining those circumstances to the Treasury Department. The Code provides
in Section 666(a) that the throwback rules apply only to complex trusts.
However, Section 665(e) adds that simple trusts are to be treated as complex
trusts "in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary . . .
The regulations address the problem by means of defining two terms of
art: "preceding taxable year" and "outside income." A preceding taxable year
is a year to which an accumulation distribution can be "thrown back."' 2 The
regulations provide that a year in which a trust was a simple trust cannot be a
"preceding taxable year" unless in that year the simple trust received "outside
income.' ' 33 Outside income is defined as amounts that are included in DNI but
are not trust accounting income. 34 Therefore, in the extraordinary dividend
example outlined immediately above, the simple trust would have outside income. The dividends are part of DNI,'35 however, under the instrument or
local law, the dividends are not part of trust accounting income. The outside
income makes the extraordinary dividend year a "preceding taxable year."
Therefore, a subsequent accumulation distribution can be thrown back to the
"'On the

application of the throwback rules to simple trusts, see generally Covey, Recent Developments
1972, 7 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1-30 through 1-35 (1973).
29
' Extraordinary dividends which the trustee in good faith allocates to corpus generally are not included in
DNI of a simple trust. I.R.C. § 643(a)(4). However, solely for purposes of the throwback rules, such
dividends are deemed to be included in DNI when paid. Treas. Reg. § 1.665(e)-IA(b), Ex. 2.
13'See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § I l-2.l(e)(I) - (3), (6), (10), (12) (McKinney 1967).
3
lI.R.C. §§ 666(a), 665(e).

Concerning Estate, Gift and Income Taxation -

"'Treas. Reg. § 1.665(e)-IA(a)(1)(i).
"'Treas. Reg. § 1.665(e)-IA(b).
'id. The regulation lists three examples of outside income: (I) income in respect of a decedent, (2) unrealized accounts receivable, and (3) distributions from another trust that include DNI or UNI. The regulations
do not express these examples as exclusive. Id.
Outside income, according to the regulations, does not include distributions from an estate, with two exceptions: income in respect of a decedent and unrealized accounts receivable. Id.Therefore, a trust receiving
a trapping distribution from an estate will not have outside income as a result of the distribution unless the
trapping distribution includes income in respect of a decedent or unrealized accounts receivable. If, however,
a revocable trust has been used as a will substitute, a trapping distribution from the inter vivos trust to a simple trust may consist entirely of outside income. The simple trust's beneficiary will be liable for a throwback

tax when that trust makes an accumulation distribution. See R. COVEY,

SHELTER DISPOSITIONS AND THE USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS 53 (1984).

'See supra note 129.
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year the dividends were paid despite the fact that the trust is a simple trust.
Application of the "outside income" regulation to the Holloway adjustment raises some of the same issues presented by the question of the proper
taxpayer for Holloway income. There is no doubt that Holloway income is included in DNI; that portion of the outside income test is met. Whether or not
Holloway income is trust accounting income recalls the earlier discussion of
whether the Holloway adjustment reduces trust accounting income. "6 This
was important in determining whether the income beneficiary should be held
responsible for the tax on Holloway income. The conclusion was that the income which makes up the Holloway adjustment is initially trust accounting income, and that the Holloway decision requires an adjustmentfrom income to
principal." 7 The transfer to the principal account does not alter the fact that

the dividends, interest, and rents earned by the trust are, upon receipt, trust accounting income. Only the amount of income required to be distributed is
reduced by the adjustment.'
Holloway income, therefore, fails the second part of the outside income
definition. Holloway income is trust accounting income and thus cannot be
outside income.'39 The taxable year in which the trustee of a simple trust makes
a Holloway adjustment is not a "preceding taxable year" within the regulations' meaning, unless there is some other source of outside income. The
trustee apparently can make the adjustment with confidence that the
beneficiary will not in some future year be faced with a tax on the Holloway
income under the throwback rules.
Although the Holloway adjustment flunks the letter of the regulations'
definition of outside income, it is pertinent to inquire whether Congress' purpose is thwarted by the above quite literal interpretation of those regulations.
If this interpretation allows an income accumulation to occur free of the
throwback rules, perhaps the interpretation should be re-examined. Doubts
should be explored especially carefully here, where Congress' purpose is effected not by statute, but by legislative regulations. 4 If the Secretary has car-

'-'See supra text accompanying notes 55-70.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
"'Seesupra text accompanying notes 63-68.
"'In Technical Advice Memorandum 8501084, the IRS concluded that Holloway income is not trust accounting income. Consequently, Holloway income is outside income and subject to the throwback rules.
The fundamental error which led the Service to these conclusions was the assumption that the Holloway
adjustment reduces trust accounting income. As explained in more detail above, (see supra text accompanying notes 58-62) accounting income, though transferred to the corpus account, is undeniably accounting income when earned. Thus, it is not trust accounting income that is reduced by the Holloway adjustment but
income "required to be distributed," the measuring rod for the trust's distribution deduction and the
beneficiary's gross income in I.R.C. §§ 65 1(a) and 652(a). Holloway income, because it is trust accounting income, cannot be outside income.
"'Legislative regulations are issued by the Treasury in response to a specific directive from Congress to
devise the rules to govern in a particular area. They are subject to less scrutiny by the courts than are interpretive regulations, which are issued on the authority of Congress' general directive in I.R.C. § 7805(a) to
prescribe rules necessary for the enforcement of the tax laws. See, e.g., Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United
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ried out Congress' mandate by adopting definitions of "preceding taxable year"
and "outside income" that are too broad or blunt for the task, then perhaps the
regulations should be clarified to cover all the situations Congress intended.
The Congressional purpose for making the throwback rules occasionally
applicable to simple trusts is difficult to divine from Section 665(e) itself. The
section merely places the responsibility on the Secretary of the Treasury to
establish when simple trusts are covered. The legislative history is of some
help. The throwback rules originated with the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
The Senate Finance Committee Report for the Code mentions the addition of
the simple trust provision,1 which had not been included in the House version
of the bill. The Report offers one sentence to explain the addition: "Thus,
distributions of extraordinary dividends accumulated by the trustee, which are
not treated as income by the trustee in the year in which received by the trust,
will fall within the provisions of subpart D [the throwback rules].' 42
It would be erroneous to conclude that Congress intended simple trusts to
be subject to the throwback rules only when they receive extraordinary
dividends which the trustee may add to trust corpus. Extraordinary dividends
are not mentioned in the Code provision the Committee drafted.' 3 Furthermore, the Secretary isgiven authority to adopt regulations dealing with all circumstances in which simple trusts are to be treated as complex trusts. Nor has
the Secretary interpreted the grant of authority as limited to the extraordinary
dividend situation. The regulations furnish three other examples of situations
where simple trusts must be treated as complex trusts.' 4 The best interpretation of Congress' intent is the one obviously adopted by the Secretary: simple
trusts are to be subject to the throwback rules in situations similar to the extraordinary dividend example, i.e., in any of those relatively rare circumstances where a simple trust acts like an accumulation trust.
The Holloway adjustment is not one of those circumstances. At first
glance, it might seem that any transfer of funds from income to corpus will
serve to "accumulate" income in the trust. However, in the Holloway context,
income is transferred to principal as a reimbursement for principal that was
previously in effect transferred to income. The corpus account's payment of income tax in year one on behalf of the income account is refunded by income in
year two. The Holloway adjustment merely restores the status quo between
the income and corpus accounts. It does not achieve a net transfer of funds
States, 562 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); Union Elec. Co. of Mo. v. United
States, 305 F.2d 850 (Ct. CI. 1962). The examination of the "outside income" regulations suggested here is
intended to be from the Treasury's point of view and not from the courts'.
" Senate Finance Comm. Rep., I.R.C. of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4621, 4999.
142Id.

"'I.R.C. § 665(c), now § 665(e).
'"Treas. Reg. § 1.665(e)- I A(b); see supra note 130.

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

from income to principal. Therefore, no accumulation occurs.
In each of the three examples in the regulations' 5 and in the one example
from the legislative history, true accumulation of taxable income occurs in the
corpus account of a simple trust. Equity between complex trusts and simple
trusts requires extension of the throwback rules to these simple trust contexts.
It does not require extending them to the Holloway adjustment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In dealing with the income tax effects of the Holloway adjustment, as
with most issues in fiduciary income tax, it is necessary to pay careful attention
to the underlying local law to correctly apply the Subchapter J rules. Here the
underlying local law, the Holloway adjustment, happens to owe its existence to
the tax law: the tax rules that make trapping distributions possible.
The most important local law question in connection with the Holloway
adjustment is whether the adjustment is mandatory or merely permissive. In
states outside New York, the adjustment clearly has only permissive status,
even in that handful of states where the adjustment is routinely made. In New
York, the adjustment is mandatory. The Holloway II decision requires it.
This conclusion, which prior to the Supreme Court's 1967 Estate of Bosch
decision would have been relatively obvious, can be reached today only after
agonizing over the odd question of whether a federal court would recognize
Holloway II as a valid statement of New York law. Because the Surrogate
Court in which Holloway was decided is not the highest court of the state, any
federal court owes the Surrogate's opinion only what one federal judge referred
to as "'proper regard'

. . .

whatever that means."'' 6 Despite the uncertainty at-

tached to all such conclusions as a result of Estate of Bosch, it can be said with
some confidence that even for a federal court, Holloway H imposes a mandatory adjustment on New York trustees.
The mandatory payment of part of a trust's accounting income to corpus
removes that income from the category of "income required to be distributed,"
a key classification in Subchapter J. Because the Holloway income is not "required to be distributed," the income beneficiary of the trust is not obliged to
include it in his or her gross income. In New York, then, the trust is by default
the taxpayer for income used to make a Holloway adjustment.
Having escaped taxation once, the beneficiary may fear that it has merely
been postponed and that some future "accumulation distribution" will trigger a
large tax under the throwback rules. A careful analysis of the "outside income"
regulations, however, as well as the policy behind them, reveals that the
1451d.
" Lake Shore Nat'l Bank v. Coyle, 296 F. Supp. 412, 418 IND. III. 1968), rev'don other grounds. 419 F. 2d
958 (7th Cir. 1970.
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throwback rules do not apply here, in letter or in spirit.
Are all these levels of complexity inevitable? They are part of the cost of a
federal system, where the underlying legal relationships to which a single tax
code applies may have as many as 50 variations. Complete uniformity and
simplicity can come only when the probate and trust laws of all the states are
homogenized in a single monolithic legal system. Until then, local law will continue to shape tax law, which occasionally will cause local law adjustments,
which may require fresh analysis for tax purposes, and so on.

